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11/22/2017

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If you shop at Amazon. FordF150. net Looking for recent topics Check Engine Light Rough Idle no power. Virtual Analyst Defense Daily Network. WPPost Object. ID 1. A top Navy official agreed with a Government Accountability Office GAO report that the services dearth of amphibious ships is decreasing its ability to train for many amphibious priorities. Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, deputy chief of naval operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy N3N5, told a House Armed Services readiness subcommittee hearing Dec. Budget Control Act BCA and repeated Continuing Resolutions CRs the shortage of amphibious ships is the primary challenge to our Amphibious Training. Weitere Artikel wie dieser Autophix OM520 OBD2 Diagnosegert Mercedes BMW Ford Honda Mazda Nissan Fiat. Up to 75 off Factory, Chilton, Haynes Ford F250 Repair Manuals. F250, F 250 Do Tuneup, rebuild, Wiring Repair. The amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge LHD 3. Photo U. S. Navy. The GAO produced a report in September that found the Navy and Marine Corps units deploying as part of Amphibious Ready Group ARG Marine Expeditionary Units MEU completed required training for amphibious operations. However, it said the Marine Corps has not been able to consistently accomplish training for other service amphibious operations priorities. The GAO found both services completed mission essential tasks like amphibious raid, assault, and noncombat evacuation operations. However, it found the Marine Corps units were unable to fully complete training for other amphibious priorities like home station unit training to support contingency requirements, service level exercises, and experimentation and concept development for amphibious operations. Ford Scanner (F-Super)' title='Ford Scanner (F-Super)' />Ford Scanner (F-Super)An analysis of interviews with 2. Marine Corps units led the GAO to find they all cited the lack of available amphibious ships as the primary factor limiting training for home station units. The Navys amphibious fleet has declined by 5. Current shipbuilding plans call for four more ships to be added to the fleet by fiscal year 2. Lewis said that although the current on hand amphibious warships fall short of the Dec. Navy Force Structure Assessment recommending 3. He also said the Navys 3. Eight years of Continuing Resolutions and caps imposed by the Budget Control Act have impacted our ability to plan and schedule training, ship maintenance, and modernization. While we have prioritized our maintenance and readiness dollars, the positive effects of funding will not remove this deficit in the near term, Lewis said in his prepared statements. Deputy Commandant pf the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations Lt. Gen. Brian Beaudreault, highlighted in his testimony that of the 3. He pointed out the 3. Wasp and America class LHDLHA amphibious assault ships, 1. San Antonio class LPD amphibious transport docks, and 1. LXR ships to replace the Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry class LSD dock landing ships. Beaudreault said the services will keep operating under the 3. FY 2. 03. 3. While modern ships are more capable than their predecessors, the Naval force lacks the capacity to conduct the necessary training when considering scheduled maintenance availabilities and current operational requirements. Lewis explained that current amphibious ships are needed to meet both combatant command operational requirements and contingency operations like hurricane relief. This limits the ability of the two services to train as an integrated force. Until we reach 3. Lewis used the example of the USS Gunston Hall LSD 4. CRs threaten readiness. The ships maintenance was cancelled in 2. CR restrictions. It eventually received deferred maintenance, but that increased the cost from 4. Beaudreault also noted that more than just an insufficient number of ships, the services are seeing capability decreases in mine countermeasure and naval surface fire support. We need a modern and capable minecounter mine MCM capability to facilitate access to and enable power projection operations throughout contested littoralsnear seas. MCM shortfalls adversely impact amphibious warfare readiness and may severely limit fleet access during future contingencies. The current 1. U. S. amphibious task force because the marine Corps needs surface fires that can provide precise, long range, and large volume capabilities, Beaudreault said. The GAO report cited a few factors beyond lack of ships. Interviewed Marine Corp units said access to range space was a problem. Officials told the GAO that priority resources like range access was given to units that will be part of an MEU deployment, leaving little time for other units. Additional factors include maintenance delays, weather delays, ship transit time to reach units, and a high pace of deployments. The GAO noted the Navy and Marine Corps were taking some steps to mitigate the training shortfall, but the efforts were incomplete because the current approach does not include strategic training and best risk management practices. It said the Marine Corps does not prioritize all available training resources, identifying units available for training when an amphibious ship is available, rather than a process tying the next highest priority units for training with available ships. Both services also do not systematically evaluate a full range of training resource alternatives to complete priorities, like using Marine Prepositioning Force ships as alternative platforms for training, using smaller Navy or pier side ships for training requirements, and adding additional training opportunities during an amphibious ships basic training phase. Moreover, the services have not developed a process or metric set to monitor progress in better achieving training priorities and mitigating existing shortfalls. The GAO said the current system does not allow officials to assess progress in achieving amphibious operations priorities or monitor efforts to establish comprehensive training programs. The GAO recommended the Marine Corps develop guidance for the development and use of virtual training devices to address these gaps, develop a joint strategy that defines common outcomes to achieve naval integration establish compatible policies, procedures, and systems  to ensure efforts are consistent and sustained and leverage resources to better maximize training opportunities. GAO And Navy Agree Lack of Available Amphibious Ships Limits Training. WPPost Object. ID 1. A House panel approved a bill Friday to re authorize an intelligence community surveillance program which allows for the collection of information on foreign adversaries and terrorists located outside the U. S. without the need for a warrant. The House Intelligence Committee voted 1. Section 7. 02 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISA for another four years to 2. The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2. Wednesday, has garnered criticism for not offering reforms to Section 7. National Security Agency NSA and FBI of Americans overseas. FBI Director Christopher Wray urged support for Section 7. House Homeland Security Committee hearing last Thursday. Its one of the most powerful tools that we have to help us evaluate leads, and prioritize threat information. Comment Installer Emulateur 3Ds Pokemon. It can tell us quickly whether a person here in the U. S. has ties to a terrorist overseas, or if there is someone overseas who is planning an attack, said Wray, during his opening remarks at the hearing on global threats. Following the bills passage, digital civil liberties watchdog group Electronic Frontier Foundation EFF published a statement detailing their concerns over 7. Intelligence Committee Chairman Rep.